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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal system is concerned with the adoption and enforcement
of rules. A disorder characterized by law breaking should be of partic-
ular interest to the law.1 Yet, the legal system has paid only minimal
1. S. SMTH & R. MEYER, LAw, BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRAC-
TICE 517 (1987). Psychopathy is a diagnosis characterized by more criminal activ-
ity than any other diagnosis. See H. EYSENCK, CRIME AND PERSONALITY (1964); S.
HuRwiTz & K. CHRISTIANSEN, CRIMINOLOGY 112-19 (1983); J. ROEBUCK, CRMUNAL
TYPOLOGY: THE LEGALISTIC, PHYSICAL-CONSTITUTION - HEREDITARY, PSYCHO-
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT
attention to the group of individuals commonly known as sociopaths
or psychopaths.2 The psychopath presents a number of issues for the
legal system, in particular the question of criminal responsibility. Spe-
cifically, is psychopathy a condition which should relieve a criminal
defendant of responsibility for his actions?3
The insanity defense is based on the notion that certain individuals,
by virtue of some mental impairment, should not be held legally re-
LOGICAL.-PSYCHIATRIC, AND SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 44-55 (1967); D. WEST,
HABITUAL OFFENDERS (1963); Barbour, Coid & Howard, The Psychometric Identi-
fication of Psychopathy in Mentally Abnormal Offenders, 9 PERSONALrTY & INDI-
vIDuAL DIFFERENCES 817 (1988); Blackburn, Psychopathy, Delinquency & Crime,
in PHYSIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 187 (1983); Gunn, Manage-
ment of Patients Who Have Committed Offenses, 30 MED. 1783 (1974); Hart,
Kropp & Hare, Performance of Male Psychopaths Following Conditional Release
from Prison, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 227 (1988); Hefilbrun,
Psychopathy and Dangerousness: Comparison, Integration and Extension of Two
Psychopathic Typologies, 24 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 181 (1985); Hofer,
Prisonization and Recidivism A Psychological Perspective, 32 INT'L J. OF-
FENDER THERAPY & Comp. CRMINOLOGY 95 (1988).
2. S. SMITH & R. MEYER, supra note 1, at 517. See also Ashworth & Shapland, Psy-
chopaths in the Criminal Process, 1980 CriM. L. REV. 628 (1980); Fairall & John-
ston, Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) and the Insanity Defense, 11 CEiM.
L.J. 78 (1987); Galliher, Edwin Sutherland's Research on the Origins of Sexual
Psychopath Laws: An Early Case Study of the Medicalization of Deviance, 33
SOCIAL PROBS. 100 (1985); Hare & McPherson, Violent and Aggressive Behavior
By Criminal Psychopaths: Empirical Approaches to Law and Psychiatry, 7 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 35 (1984); Hare, McPherson, & Forth, Male Psychopaths and
Their Criminal Careers, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 710 (1988);
Prins, Mad or Bad: Thoughts on the Equivocal Relationship Between Mental Dis-
order and Criminality, 3 INT'L JL. & PSYCHIATRY 421 (1980); Rogers & Zimbarg,
Antisocial Backgrounds of Defendants Evaluated for Insanity: A Research Note,
10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 75 (1987); Wilcox, The Relationship of Mental illness
to Homicide, 6 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 3 (1985).
Although the terms are not entirely synonymous with one another, for the
purposes of this Comment, the terms sociopathy, psychopathy and antisocial per-
sonality disorder will be used interchangeably. Where the definitions are impor-
tantly distinct, such differences will be noted.
3. S. SMITH & R. MEYER, supra note 1, at 517. See also Applicability of Insanity
Defense Considered by Two State Supreme Courts, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISA-
BLIrY L. REP. 96 (1984).
There are additional implications for the legal system's ability to deal with
psychopaths because they do not appear to be particularly responsive to treat-
ment and thus, may become repeat offenders. See Ashworth & Shapland, supra
note 2, at 639; McCord, The Effectiveness of Milieu Therapy with Psychopaths, 4
MILIEU THERAPY 29 (1985); Jenkins & Beidleman, Challenges in the Treatment of
Antisocial Patients: Joint Conference of the National Coalition of Arts Therapy
Association, 14 ARTS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 223 (1987); Ogloff, Wong & Greenwood,
Treating Criminal Psychopaths in a Therapeutic Community Program, -
BEHAV. SCI. & L. - (in press); Weller, Medical Concepts in Psychopathy and Vio-
lence, 26 IED. SC. L. 131 (1986); Woody, McLellan & Luborsky, Sociopathy and
Psychopathy Outcome, 42 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1081 (1985).
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sponsible for their actions.4 Over the years, there have been a variety
of tests of insanity used in the United States.5 In the 1960s the Ameri-
can Law Institute ("ALI") developed the Model Penal Code test of
insanity.6 Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise an-
tisocial conduct.7
Subsection (1) was drafted to contain the standard for determining
whether a person should be held responsible for conduct that would
otherwise be criminal.8 According to this provision, only those indi-
viduals who possess "a mental disease or defect" leading to an inability
to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct, or an inability to con-
form their conduct to the requirements of law, should be deemed
4. Why should certain individuals not be held criminally responsible for their ac-
tions? It seems intuitively correct to say that a man who thinks he is squeezing a
lemon when he is in fact strangling his wife should not be held liable for first
degree murder. Yet, why must that be so? It must be so, because our conception
of responsibility is based on ideas about human beings and their capabilities, such
as their ability to reason rationally and to make decisions. This conception of
responsibility has not often been clearly articulated, and because it has not been
articulated, mental illness has been deemed the exculpating factor without fur-
ther explanation. This has led psychology and psychiatry to become dominant
forces in building an insanity defense. However, the role that psychological ex-
planations for behavior have played has been based on unarticulated and incor-
rect conceptions of responsibility. See notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
Psychological explanations for behavior can be applied to the legal conception of
mental disease when they are focused on the reasons underlying the insanity de-
fense. See infra notes 151-70 and accompanying text. Psychological testimony is
appropriate to demonstrate that a person by virtue of mental illness is incapable
of exercising those faculties which most people have, that is, to think rationally
and act upon those thoughts.
5. Until the advent of the Model Penal Code test of insanity, discussed infra notes 6-
12 and accompanying text, the M'Naghten test had been most widely used. In
Regina v. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843), the court stated:
To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be conclu-
sively proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from the disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
For other tests, see, eg., Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1954)("[Ain accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is a product
of mental disease or of mental defect"); Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So.
854, 866-67 (1887)(irresistible impulse test).
6. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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blameless.9
Although the Model Penal Code does not attempt to define
"mental disease or defect," subsection (2) of 4.01 includes a cautionary
limitation.O Subsection (2) excludes from the concept of "mental dis-
ease or defect" abnormalities manifested only by repeated criminal be-
havior or otherwise antisocial conduct.' The ALI explicitly rejected
the position that repeated wrongful conduct suffices to establish an
exonerating condition. However, the ALI in no way attempted to pre-
vent a defendant from presenting a defense of insanity "so long as the
condition is manifested by indicia other than repeated antisocial
behavior."12
At the time the caveat paragraph was adopted, critics believed it to
be a presumptuous legal intervention into the realm of psychiatric
theory.13 One commentator specifically stated that the Model Penal
Code's efforts to exclude psychopaths from those eligible for the in-
sanity defense was illogical when seen from a psychiatric point of
view:
[W]hy not do what the ALI recommends,.. and exclude the sociopath from
the benefits of the relaxed rule of responsibility? The answer is that such
special restrictive clauses aimed at excluding certain specified categories of
9. This Comment will not be addressing the correctness of paragraph 1 of the Model
Penal Code test as a proper test for nonresponsibility. Criticisms of the test
abound in the legal literature. See eg., Weschler, The Criteria of Criminal Re-
sponsibility, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 367 (1955). Rather, this Comment will focus on
the language "mental disease or defect" and whether, given a proper conception
of legal responsibility, psychopathy should be considered a mental disease or de-
fect for purposes of the insanity defense.
10. Most legislatures have accepted the caveat paragraph. See, ag., ALA. CODE § 13A-
3-1 (1982 & 1989 Cur. Supp.); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-312 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 39 (Cum.
Supp. 1989). However, not all states have included the caveat paragraph as part
of their insanity defense. See eg., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.086 (Vernon 1979).
The District of Columbia considers the caveat paragraph in ruling on the ad-
missibility of prior antisocial conduct as evidence of "mental disease," but does
not use it to instruct the jury. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 992-94
(1972). Other federal circuits have fully accepted the caveat paragraph. See
United States v. Frazier, 458 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1972); Blake v. United States, 407
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 926, 927 (4th Cir.
1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Freeman, 357 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 761, 774
n.32 (3d Cir. 1961). Only the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have entirely rejected the
caveat paragraph. See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 727, 727 n.8 (6th Cir. 1968). The status of the caveat in
the Tenth Circuit is unclear. See Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 430 (10th Cir.
1963).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, at 164 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., J. BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND 160 (1955); Guttmacher, Current Trends in
Regard to Criminal Responsibility, 117 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 684 (1961); Weihofen,
The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OMO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1960).
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individuals from exculpation simply do not make any psychiatric sense. They
are as arbitrary and capricious as excluding defendants with red hair or blue
eyes or Negro blood from the benefits of the law of criminal responsibility.
They define by legislative fiat what is and what is not a psychiatric
condition.1 4
Some courts have rejected or qualified the caveat paragraph for
fear of excluding certain defendants who should be able to present the
insanity defense.15 For example, in Wade v. United States,'6 the court
stated:
While we approve paragraph (1) of the A.L.I. test... we are unable to find
comparable merit in paragraph (2). The drafters of the A.L.I. test apparently
intended to exclude certain psychopathic personalities from those who might
otherwise be found to suffer from a "mental disease or defect." Noted medical
authorities have responded that the second paragraph fails to achieve its pur-
pose and fails to establish any meaningful test. The Sixth Circuit, noting the
"great dispute over the psychiatric soundness of section 4.01(2)," has expressly
refused to adopt it ....
The inclusion of Section 4.01(2) in an insanity instruction should have little
or no impact on the determination of the criminal responsibility of any men-
tally deranged defendant, whether psychopathic or not, since it is practically
inconceivable that a mental disease or defect would, in the terms of paragraph
(2), be "manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial
conduct."
1 7
The purpose of the caveat paragraph was to narrow the scope of what
type of evidence could be used to establish the existence of a "mental
disease or defect." Generally, a psychiatrist or psychologist might
present evidence regarding what the defendant said or did, evidence
which would reflect on the defendant's cognitive or affective capaci-
ties.1 8 However, the ALI wanted to prevent a psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist from trying to present evidence solely about the defendant's
antisocial actions in the hope that the jury might take evidence of
what might establish a psychiatric "disease" and find that the defend-
ant suffered from a "mental disease or defect" as defined by the Model
Penal Code.
However, the Wade court ignored the purpose of having this caveat
paragraph. 19 Instead of relying on legal conceptions of responsibility,
the Wade court gave considerable deference to the medical authorities
14. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 193-94
(1962)(footnotes omitted).
15. See supra note 10.
16. 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970).
17. Id. at 72-73 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
18. This testimony would be elicited in order to shed some light on the defendant's
ability to "appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
19. United States v. Wade, 426 F.2d 64,72-73 (9th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 727, 727 n.8 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Brawner, the court did not completely reject the
[Vol. 69:190
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who were looking to the diagnostic category for psychopaths as a basis
for finding impaired mental functioning.20
caveat paragraph, but it did refuse to give it as an instruction to the jury. The
court stated-
The judge will be aware that the criminal and antisocial conduct of a
person... is necessarily material information for assessment by the psy-
chiatrist. On the other hand, rarely if ever would a psychiatrist base a
conclusion of mental disease solely on criminal and anti-social acts. Our
pragmatic solution provides for reshaping the rule, for application by the
court as follows: The introduction or proffer of past criminal and anti-
social actions is not admissible as evidence of mental disease unless ac-
companied by expert testimony, supported by a showing of the concor-
dance of a responsible segment of professional opinion, that the
particular characteristics of these actions constitute convincing evidence
of an underlying mental disease that substantially impairs behavioral
controls....
We do not think it desirable to use the caveat paragraph as a basis for
instructions to the jury. It would be difficult for a juryman - or anyone
else - to reconcile the caveat paragraph and the... definition of mental
disease [from § 4.01(1)] if a psychiatrist testified that he discerned from
particular past criminal behavior a pattern that established defendant as
suffering from an abnormal condition of the mind that substantially im-
paired behavioral controls.... An instruction along the lines of the ca-
veat paragraph runs the risk of appearing to call for the rejection of
testimony that is based materially, but only partially, on the history of
criminal conduct.
Id. at 994.
Query if the Brawner court carefully considered the implicit result of such a
statement. The court seemed to be calling for conclusory testimony from an ex-
pert that "he discerned from particular past criminal behavior a pattern that es-
tablished the defendant as suffering from an abnormal condition of the mind that
substantially impaired behavior controls." Such a determination should be left to
a jury.
The fact that it is supposed to be a jury determination is all the more reason
for instructing the jury of the necessity to sort out the mental impairment, which
is an excusing factor, from simple antisocial behavior, which the ALI intended
not to be an excusing factor.
20. Cf. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 761, 763 (3d Cir. 1961). In Currens, the
court held that whether a person is classified as a psychopath, and is thus, crimi-
nally responsible is a jury question to be determined from the totality of the de-
fendant's symptoms. The court stated-
We are aware that some jurists and legal scholars are of the view
that, as a matter of law, a psychopath is not "insane." This view seems to
be based on a fear that a rule recognizing that a psychopath may not be
capable of possessing a "guilty mind" would open the door to the acquit-
tal of persons accused of crime solely on the basis of a history of recur-
rent antisocial conduct. It is readily apparent that this objection to the
inclusion of psychopaths among those entitled to raise the defense of in-
sanity assumes a particular definition of psychopathy; viz., that the term
psychopathy comprehends a person who is a habitual criminal but whose
mind is functioning normally. Perhaps some laymen and, indeed some
psychiatrists, do define the term that broadly, and insofar as the term
psychopathy does merely indicate a pattern of recurrent criminal behav-
ior we would certainly agree that it does not describe a disorder which
can be considered insanity for purposes of a defense to a criminal action.
But, we are aware of the fact that psychopathy, or sociopathy, is a term
1990]
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As a practical matter, when the insanity defense is raised, psychol-
ogists or psychiatrists are expected to testify. The ALI wanted to
make it clear that despite a psychiatric diagnosis of and testimony
about repeated antisocial behavior, the jury should be required to
identify evidence presented at trial representing an indication of some
mental disease or defect 2 ' distinct from the antisocial behavior about
which the mental health professional may be testifying.22 Although
mental health professionals may choose to recognize a mental disease
based primarily upon repeated antisocial behavior,23 a legal concep-
tion of "mental disease or defect" may not allow antisocial behavior to
which means different things to experts in the fields of psychiatry and
psychology. Indeed a confusing welter of literature has grown up about
the term causing some authorities to give up its use in dismay, labelling
it a "waste basket category...."
Our study has, however, revealed two very persuasive reasons why
this court should not hold that evidence of psychopathy is insufficient, as
a matter of law, to put insanity or mental illness in issue. First, it is clear
that as the majority of experts use the term, a psychopath is very distin-
guishable from one who merely demonstrates recurrent criminal behav-
ior...
[1]n many cases the adjective "psychopathic" will be applied by ex-
perts to persons who are very ill indeed. It would not be proper for this
court in this case to deprive a large heterogenous group of offenders of
the defense of insanity by holding blindly and indiscriminately that a
person described as psychopathic is always criminally responsible.
Our second reason for not holding that psychopaths are "sane" as a
matter of law is based on the vagaries of the term itself. In each individ-
ual case all the pertinent symptoms of the accused should be put before
the court and jury and the accused's criminal responsibility should be
developed from the totality of his symptoms. A court of law is not an
appropriate forum for a debate as to the meaning of abstract psychiatric
classifications. The criminal law is not concerned with such classifica-
tions but with the fundamental issue of criminal responsibility. Testi-
mony and argument should relate primarily to the subject of the
criminal responsibility of the accused and specialized terminology should
be used only where it is helpful in determining whether a particular de-
fendant should be held to the standards of the criminal law.
Id. at 761-63 (citations omitted).
21. It is the role of the jury, rather than psychiatrists, to determine what is properly a
"mental disease or defect" for purposes of the insanity defense. Compare the
"Guilty but Mentally Ill" verdict ("GBI"), which appears to be looking for a
clinical definition of mental illness. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36
(West 1982)(GBMI option); MCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400(a)(West
1980)(mental illness defined).
22. Precisely what psychiatrists and psychologists testifying as experts should be al-
lowed to say remains controversial, particularly with regard to giving diagnoses
and testifying in conclusory, legal terms. FED. R. EviD. 704(b)(Hinkley Amend-
ment). Compare Bonnie, Morality, Equality and Expertise: Renegotiating the Re-
lationship Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL AM. ACAD.
PsYCHIATRY & L. 5, 8, 14-17 (1984) with Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Sci-
ence: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 604-15 (1978).
23. See in fra notes 77-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the DSM-IIIR and
the diagnostic criteria for the antisocial personality disorder. There are, however,
other diagnostic techniques available besides the DSM-IIR. See infra note 180.
[Vol. 69:190
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be the sole basis of the mental impairment.24 In fact, if the conception
of mental disease or defect presented in this Comment is taken seri-
ously, it will become quite clear that psychopathy is not a "mental dis-
ease or defect" that should lead to exoneration from criminal liability.
The ALI stated that the reason it included this paragraph was be-
cause there were conceptions of psychopathy or sociopathy as forms of
mental illness that should not be given the benefit of an insanity de-
fense.25 As shall be discussed in Part HI of this Comment, this deter-
mination was a bit premature, as there was no diagnostic category
manifest entirely by antisocial conduct in effect at the time the Model
Penal Code was adopted.26 However, with the revision of the Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IIIR), such a concern is real, as the
current diagnostic category27 is primarily based on antisocial behav-
ior.28 The concern exists because there is always the possibility that
the jury will give deference to the experts testifying rather than make
a legal determination of what constitutes a "mental disease or
defect." 29
Part I1 of this Comment will describe the characteristics of psy-
chopathy so that the reader will have a better understanding of the
type of individual in question. In addition, Part II will present the
current psychiatric criteria for labeling an individual a psychopath.
Part III of this Comment will present the prominent psychiatric view
that psychopaths by virtue of their diagnosis should be exonerated
from criminal liability. This view has evolved out of the idea that psy-
chopathy is a condition that results from certain causal factors, and in
Part III the biological and psychological explanations for the causes of
psychopathy will be examined. Further, a response will be made to
the view that where causal agents can be identified for behavior, the
defendant should be legally excused for his or her actions. Since all
24. Unfortunately, the ALI gave no guidance as to exactly what constitutes a "mental
disease or defect." Certainly, the ALI did not intend it to be a clinical definition
but rather a legal one. The best guidance as to what type of impairment should
qualify under this definition has been given by Michael Moore. See infra notes
158-67 and accompanying text. See also M. PERLiN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIvIL AND CRmINAL, § 2.05 (1989).
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 explanatory note (Official Draft and Revised Com-
mentaries 1962).
26. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
27. The current diagnostic category is not called sociopathy or psychopathy. Rather,
it is known as an antisocial personality disorder. See infra note 78 and accompa-
nying text.
28. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
29. See Morse, supra note 22, at 604-15. Ogloff found that simulated jurors rely heav-
ily on the testimony of mental health professionals when deciding whether to
find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity. J. Ogloff, A Comparison of the
Impact of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision-Making (1990)(unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln).
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behavior is in some sense "caused," this view cannot substantiate ex-
cusing a person merely because he or she has a diagnosable mental
illness. Rather, some other basis for excuse must be discovered.
Part IV of this Comment will discuss the most logical basis for ex-
cusing those with diagnosable mental illnesses. The basis for the ex-
cuse must be tied to the reasons most "normal" people are held
criminally responsible for their actions. Yet, in Part V, it will be
demonstrated that psychopathy itself is not a proper subject for the
insanity defense. Thus, the ALI was perfectly correct in trying to ex-
clude individuals diagnosed as psychopaths from presenting evidence
of their antisocial behavior as the sole basis for relief from criminal
liability.
II. WHAT IS A PSYCHOPATH?
A. Historical Overview
Attempts to clarify the concept of psychopathy began in the early
1800's when the French psychiatrist Phillippe Pinel coined the term
manie sans delire (mania without insanity). He used this term to de-
scribe a group of behavioral disorders characterized by asocial and an-
tisocial actions but without features of "mental illness."30 In 1835, J.C.
Pritchard, a British psychiatrist, renamed these disorders "moral in-
sanity." He believed that this behavior manifested a failure to abide
by society's expectations of religious, ethical, and cultural conduct.31
Pritchard's terminology was used for over fifty years until Koch, a
German psychiatrist, decided that the term "moral insanity" had un-
warranted, negative connotations, and he proposed that a more accept-
able designation would be "psychopathic inferiority."32
In the years that followed, psychologists attempted to develop clas-
sification schemes for psychopathy,33 and in 1930 G. E. Partridge con-
sidered psychopathy an exclusively social maladjustment and specified
that "sociopath" was a more applicable label.34 In 1952, the American
Psychiatric Association dropped "psychopath" and officially adopted
"sociopath," or more specifically, "sociopathic personality distur-
30. C. BARToL, CRIMNAL BEHAvOiP' A PsYCHOsOcIAL APPROACH 51 (1980).
31. See J. PRITCHARD, TREATISE ON INSANITY AND OTHER DISORDERs AFFECTiNG THE
MmD (1835).
32. See Preu, The Concept of Psychopathic Personality, in 2 PERSONALITY AND THE
BEHAVIOR DisoREs (J. Hunt ed. 1944).
33. See, e.g., E. KRAEPELiN, TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY (1913)(delineating seven cate-
gories of psychopathy: excitable, unstable, impulsive, eccentric, liars and swin-
dlers, antisocial, and quarrelsome).
34. See Pennington, Psychopathic and Criminal Behavior, in AN INTRODUCTION TO
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (L. Pennington & I. Berg eds. 1966).
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bance."35 In 1968, the American Psychiatric Association changed the
1952 classification of "sociopathic personality disturbance, antisocial
reaction" to "personality disorder, antisocial type."3 6
Whatever the medical profession has chosen to call this personality
type, the public generally associates the psychopath with criminality.3 7
While any particular psychopath may or may not be a criminal,38 he or
she demonstrates verifiable behavior and predispositions different
from those of the general population.3 9
B. Behavioral Descriptions 4O
The most comprehensive authority on the behavioral characteris-
tics of the psychopath is The Mask of Sanity, written by Hervey
Cleckley.X Cleckley described the psychopath as having superficial
35. AMERIcAN PsYCHIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (1952).
36. AmRICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968)[hereinafter DSM-II].
37. One criminal considered to be a sociopath was Neville Heath, who committed two
of the most brutal murders in history. See P. HILL, PORTRAIT OF A SADIST (1960).
For a good description of the murders and Heath's personality, see INFAMOuS
MURDERS 14-21 (Verdit Press ed. 1975). In modem days, the 'illside Strangler"
was thought to be a sociopath. See Watkins, The Bianchi (LA Hillside Strangler)
Case: Sociopath or Multiple Personality?, 32 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 67 (1984).
38. Most antisocial people who have been studied have been institutionalized, typi-
cally in prisons. However, not all psychopaths are caught and jailed. Some do not
violate the criminal law but may be antisocial in other respects. See Widon, A
Methodology for Studying Noninstitutionalized Psychopaths, 45 J. CONSULTING
& CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 674 (1977). See also Winslow & Solomon, Entrepre-
neurs Are More than Non-Conformists: They Are Mildly Sociopathic, 21 J. CREA-
TrVE BEHAV. 202 (1987).
39. H. CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (5th ed. 1976).
40. R. HARE, PSYCHOPATHY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1970), outlines three
subcategories of psychopaths: the primary psychopath, the secondary
psychopath, and the dyssocial psychopath. Secondary psychopaths are
individuals who commit antisocial or violent acts because of severe emotional
problems or inner conflicts. The dyssocial psychopaths demonstrate aggressive,
antisocial behavior which they have learned from their subculture. See also
Howard, One Concept or Two? A Reply to Raine, 9 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIFFERENCES 829 (1988); Raine, Psychopathy: A Single or Dual Concept?, 9
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 825 (1988). C. Blackburn, On Moral
Judgments and Personality Disorders: The Myth of Psychopathic Personality
Revisited, 153 BRrr. J. PSYCHIATRY 505 (1988)(too heterogenous to group into
categories); Lewis, Psychopathic Personality: A Most Elusive Category, 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL MED. 133 (1974).
This Comment is principally concerned with what Hare called the primary
psychopath. See R. HARE, supra. This category is characterized primarily by
antisocial behavior devoid of any cognitive or emotional impairments, and thus,
would be of most concern when applying the Model Penal Cede caveat
paragraph.
41. H. CLECEaY, supra note 39. See also Blashfield & McElroy, The 1985 Journal
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charm and above, to above average, intellectual ability.42 The outward
characteristics manifested by the sociopath "suggest desirable and su-
perior human qualities, a robust mental health."43 Cleckley stated
that psychopaths come across initially as friendly and outgoing."
They appear well educated and knowledgeable, displaying many
interests.45
In Cleckley's clinical work, he found that psychopaths lack neu-
rotic, psychotic, or emotional problems, such as excessive worry and
anxiety, irrational thinking, neuroses, delusions, severe depression, or
hallucinations.46 Cleckley stated that the psychopath maintains "ex-
cellent logical reasoning" and "can foresee the consequences of injudi-
cious or antisocial acts, outline acceptable or admirable plans of life,
and ably criticize in words his or her former mistakes."47 Psychiatric
examinations would disclose nothing that would indicate incompe-
tency or suggest that the psychopath could not lead a successful and
happy life.48
Cleckley stated that not only is the psychopath rational, he or she
appears to react with normal emotions.49 Yet, psychopaths do, in fact,
have a deficit of emotional reactions. For example, although they may
become outraged and shout, they only effectively mimic appropriate
emotions rather than experience genuine feelings.50
Cleckley found that although psychopaths enjoy practical jokes,
they lack a genuine sense of humor and ability to laugh at them-
selves.51 Psychopaths are selfish and principally unable to love or give
affection to others.52 Nevertheless, the psychopath's inability to love
is not absolute. He or she is capable of affection, of "casual fondness,"
but the duration and strength is severely limited.53
Cleckley found psychopaths to be unreliable, irresponsible, and un-
predictable regardless of the importance of the occasion or conse-
quence of their actions.54 The pattern may be cyclical, i.e., they may
act responsibly for a period of time, but then become irresponsible
Literature on Personality Disorders, 28 COMPREHENsIVE PSYCHIATRY 536 (1987);
Reid, The Antisocial Personality: A Review, 36 HosP. & CoMMuNITY PSYCHIATRY
831 (1985).
42. H. CLECKLEY, supra note 39, at 338-39.
43. Id. at 339.
44. Id. at 338.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 339.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 348.
51. Id. at 349.
52. Id. at 346-47.
53. Id. at 347.
54. Id. at 340-41.
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again.5 5 The pattern itself cannot be predicted as there seems to be no
relation to stress or mood. Further, the unreliability is marked by
demonstrations of conforming behavior whose motives and incentives
may not be that of the average person.5 6
Cleckley described the psychopath as an individual who has no re-
gard for truth and appears to have no internalized moral or ethical
sense.5 7 Yet, many times he or she appears candid and trustworthy.
Although a psychopath would lie "about any matter, under any cir-
cumstances, and often for no good reason," the psychopath sometimes
discloses errors and appears to be honestly facing consequences of his
or her actions.56
Cleckley found that a lack of remorse or guilt regardless of the
severity or immorality or consequences of their actions was most dis-
tinctive of psychopaths.59 In particular, they might engage in destruc-
tive or antisocial behavior with absurd risks and insignificant personal
gains, such as forgery, adultery, and fraud, and will often have no ap-
parent goal motivating their actions.60 Psychopaths have a need to ex-
perience thrills and excitement and, thus, are impulsive. Their
profound stimulation seeking leads many psychopaths to be drawn
into dangerous activities. 61
Despite the psychopath's "excellent rational powers," Cleckley
found the psychopath to be incapable of learning to avoid failure and
future situations which could bring him or her harm, e.g., a jail term.62
55. rd. at 341.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 341-42. Recent studies have dealt with two characteristics that bear on the
psychopath's moral development: their relative immunity to the deterrent ef-
fects of punishment and their attraction to new experiences. See McCord, The
Psychopath and Moral Development, in PERSONALITY THEORY, MORAL DEVELOP-
MENT, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 357-72 (W. Laufer & J. Day eds. 1983). See also
Smith, The Psychopath as Moral Agent, 45 PHiL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 177
(1984). These characteristics relate to a psychopath's inability to internalize so-
cial norms and values of the external social world. McCord, supra. When norms
are internalized, it means that an individual accepts events or beliefs and makes
them a part of his or her own thinking. Some have stated that the psychopath
may not be able to internalize societal values. Thus, he or she may be more likely
to violate them because the only sense of right or wrong the individual values is
his or her own. See Fodor, Moral Development and Parent Behavior Antecedents
in Adolescent Psychopaths, 122 GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY 37 (1973)(found that the
psychopath demonstrates a primitive level of moral reasoning). Psychopaths be-
lieve in self-gain, having little understanding of the feelings of others. The em-
phasis here is on meeting one's own needs, looking at human relationships as
those of a marketplace or as means to an end, not of loyalty or justice.
58. H. CLECLEY, supra note 39, at 342.
59. Id. at 343.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 343-44. See also Sutker, Behavior and Personality Assessment in Men La-
beled Adaptive Sociopaths, 5 J. BEHAv. AssESsMENT 65 (1983).
62. H. CLECKLEY, supra note 39, at 345-46. There is specific experimental evidence
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Yet, despite poor judgment demonstrated in actual daily living the
psychopath demonstrates unimpaired judgment in appraising situa-
tions involving ethical, emotional, and other evaluational factors. It
appears only to be the concrete situation in which he or she is a par-
ticipant that the psychopath makes inappropriate choices. So long as
the psychopath is asked what should be done, and not to actually do
something, the psychopath performs well.63
The psychopath suffers from an inability to gain insight into his or
her own actions.64 This lack of insight often is demonstrated by his or
her apparent assumption that legal penalties for a crime committed
should not apply to him or her.6 5 Instead of accepting facts that would
normally lead to insight, psychopaths project and externalize blame
onto others for their misfortune. 66 Occasionally, the psychopath will
accept blame for his or her actions, but Cleckley found this to be at
best an "excellent mimicry" at accepting responsibility. 67
Cleckley found that small amounts of alcohol prompt most psycho-
paths to become vulgar, domineering, loud, boisterous, and to engage
in practical jokes and pranks.68 Cleckley found that the psychopath
exhibits suicidal tendencies. Cleckley pointed out that many psycho-
paths get themselves into situations in which the "normal man" would
end his own life. Yet, he or she rarely carries out the threat of sui-
cide.69 Finally, the psychopath's sex life shows certain "peculiari-
ties."70 Tied to their inability to feel deep emotional love, the
psychopath's sexual activities are limited to physical contact, free from
emotional attachment. Sex becomes casual to most psychopaths, and
their need to have sex is less strong than at first glance71 Their rec-
ord of sexual promiscuity seems more closely related to their lack of
self-restraint than to a strong sex drive.72
supporting Cleckley's observation that psychopaths are unable to learn. See infra
notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
63. H. CLECKLEY, supra note 39, at 346.
64. Id. at 350.
65. Id. at 351.
66. Id. at 350.
67. Id. at 350-51.
68. Id. at 356. See also Grande, Associations Among Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, and
Antisocial Personality: A Review of the Literature, 55 PsYCHOLOGICAL REP. 455
(1984); Jaffe, Babor & Fishbein, Alcoholics, Aggression and Antisocial Personal-
ity, 49 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 211 (1988); Kofoed, Alcoholism and Antisocial Personal-
ity: The Sociobiology of an Addiction, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 332
(1986); Lewis, Cloninger & Pais, Alcoholism, Antisocial Personality and Drug
Use in a Criminal Population, 18 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 53 (1983).
69. H. CLECKLEY, supra note 39, at 358-59.
70. Id. at 359.
71. Id. at 361-62.
72. Id. at 363.
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To summarize, Cleckley's main features of psychopathy, developed
primarily from clinical experience, are:
1. Superficial charm and good intelligence;
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking,
3. Absence of nervousness or neurotic manifestations;
4. Unreliability;
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity;
6. Lack of remorse or shame;
7. Antisocial behavior without apparent compunction;
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn from experience;
9. Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love;
10. General poverty in major affective reactions;
11. Specific loss of insight;
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations;
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior, particularly with alcohol;
14. Suicide threats rarely carried out;
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated; and
16. Failure to follow any life plan.73
Cleckley's description of the psychopath had a profound impact in
the treatment and diagnosis of psychopathy. The Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual ("DSM-II") that was in effect when the Model Penal
Code was adopted included a similar set of descriptive terms that
could be used to diagnosis the condition:
The term [antisocial personality] is reserved for individuals who are basi-
cally unsocialized and whose behavior pattern brings them repeatedly into
conflict with society. They are incapable of significant loyalty to individuals,
groups, or social values.
They are grossly selfish, callous, irresponsible, impulsive, and unable to
feel guilt or to learn from experience and punishment. Frustration tolerance
is low. They tend to blame others or offer plausible rationalizations for their
73. Id. at 337-38. However comprehensive Cleckley's characteristics are, there has
been considerable disagreement about the traits which describe the psychopath.
For example, in one survey, Canadian psychiatrists were presented with twenty-
nine concepts typically used to describe the psychopath and asked to rank order
the ten concepts that they considered most meaningful. No clear overall charac-
terization emerged, but the most frequently selected traits were:
1. Does not profit from experience;
2. Lack of sense of responsibility;,
3. Unable to form meaningful relationships;
4. Lack of control over impulses;
5. Lack of moral sense;
6. Chronically a recurrent antisocial;
7. Punishment does not alter behavior,
8. Emotionally immature;
9. Unable to experience guilt;
10. Self-centered.
S. SMITH & R. MEYER, supra note 1, at 520.
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behavior. A mere history of repeated legal or social offenses is not stfficient
to justify this diagnosis.7 4
When the Model Penal Code was adopted, there was no diagnostic cat-
egory that was manifested merely by repeated antisocial behavior. As
the DSM-II provided, to receive the diagnosis of antisocial personality,
one needed to exhibit other characteristics such as being irresponsible,
impulsive, and grossly selfish. Yet, the ALI recognized the substantial
role that antisocial conduct played in the diagnosis and wanted to
make sure that a jury was able to sort out purely antisocial behavior
from what should be considered to constitute evidence of a "mental
disease or defect." Of particular concern was the fact that the DSM-II
did not contain explicit criteria for diagnosis, leaving clinicians using
these manuals on their own to define the content and boundaries of
these categories.75 Thus, a clinician could have chosen to give a diag-
nosis to a habitual offender who had committed severe and numerous
crimes, but also exhibited some, although minor and not necessarily
deviant, degrees of impulsivity or callousness. The clinician might
properly believe that he or she had given a meaningful diagnosis to
such an individual and might, in fact, have done so for the purpose of
treatment. However, the purpose of treatment and the purpose of de-
termining legal responsibility are not necessarily the same since a di-
agnosis given in the former situation may not be applicable in the
latter.76
In contrast to the DSM-II, the American Psychiatric Association's
most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-Revised ("DSM-
IIIR") provides specific diagnostic criteria as guides for making each
diagnosis. The specific criteria are designed to enhance diagnostic reli-
ability.77 The DSM-IIIR does not use the terms psychopath or soci-
opath; nor does it rely on Cleckley's description or the DSM-II
diagnostic criteria. Rather, the DSM-IIIR describes what has been
commonly known as sociopathy or psychopathy as the "antisocial per-
sonality disorder,"7 8 and gives a limited and concise set of diagnostic
criteria on which to base the diagnosis.
To be assigned the label antisocial personality disorder, one must
74. DSM-II, supra note 36, at 43 (emphasis added).
75. AMERIcAN PsYciIATRIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS xxiv (3d ed. rev. 1987)[hereinafter DSM-IIIR].
76. See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
77. DSM-IIIR, supra note 75, at xxiv.
78. Actually, the DSM-IIIR differentiates between two types of disorders: the adult
antisocial behavior disorder and the antisocial personality disorder. The antiso-
cial behavior disorder merely involves antisocial behaviors and does not require
anything more for the diagnosis. However, the antisocial personality disorder in-
volves some personality characteristics. The caveat paragraph would automati-
cally exclude the antisocial behavior disorder, but not the antisocial personality
disorder. Thus, the antisocial personality disorder will be discussed as the pri-
mary diagnosis of concern in this Comment. Id. at 359.
[Vol. 69:190
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT
be at least eighteen years old; have the onset of the problem before age
fifteen with no intervening problem-free period of five years or more;
and show no evidence of mental retardation, schizophrenia, or mania.
In addition, an individual must exhibit at least four of the following:
1) inability to sustain consistent employment; 2) inability to function
as an effective parent; 3) failure to accept social norms evidenced by
persistent criminal behavior; 4) inability to maintain enduring sexual/
affectionate relations; 5) irritability and aggressiveness; 6) failure to
honor financial obligations; 7) impulsivity; 8) disregard for the truth,
including conning others for profit; 9) recklessness; and 10) lack of
remorse.79
The DSM-IIIR is commonly used in clinical practice today.8 0
Rather than traditional definitions such as Cleckley's, the DSM-IIIR
may be used to say to the jury, "This individual has a mental illness
currently recognized by the psychiatric profession," and by implica-
tion, "he or she must have a 'mental disease or defect."' The defini-
tion of psychopathy embodied in the DSM-IIIR will be discussed in the
remainder of this Comment.S1
Among the crucial features believed to distinguish psychopaths in
the early literature were: lack of guilt or remorse, inability to profit
from experience, inability to delay gratification, inability to form last-
ing emotional ties, stimulus seeking, and superficial charm.8 2 How-
ever, the DSM-IIIR presently does not require that an inability to
profit from experience be present in order to make this diagnosis.83
The inability to learn from past mistakes might be seen as a cognitive
79. Id. at 342-46. The DSM-IIIR has been criticized as being too inclusive and ignor-
ing certain key concepts used in the past to identify sociopaths. See, eg., Assess-
ment of Psychopathy, infra note 180; MacKay, Psychopathy and Pathological
Narcissism" A Descriptive and Psychodynamic Formulation on the Antisocial
Personality Disorder, 11 J. OFFENDER COUNSELING SERVICES & REHABILITATION
77 (1986).
80. DSM-IIIR, supra note 75, at xviii.
81. Query whether the diagnostic criteria that Cleckley used for diagnosing soci-
opathy would be sufficient to find a "mental disease or defect." Using the concep-
tion of responsibility and the reasons why mental impairments should act as
exonerating conditions that are presented in this Comment, arguably the soci-
opath would still be held liable. Even Cleckley's description is marked by an
absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. Although Cleckley's
descriptions of psychopathy remain important, particularly in academic research
on psychopathy, his descriptions will not be considered further in this Comment.
Rather, the DSM-IIR diagnostic criteria will be considered primarily because of
its prominence both in present-day clinical practice and in the court system.
82. See supra notes 40-73 and accompanying text.
83. The absence of a requirement of "lack of guilt or remorse" is also exceptional
since it is probably the most commonly identified feature in the literature dealing
with these individuals and the one characteristic that most clinicians believed to
be the defining feature of psychopathy. Marshall & Barbaree, Disorders of Per-
sonality, Impulse, & Adjustment, in ADULT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND DIAGNOSIS
406-49 (S. Turner & M. Hersen eds. 1984).
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impairment, substantially different from normal functioning and
might allow an individual to present evidence of the presence of a
"mental disease or defect." However, given the diagnostic criteria
used in the DSM-IIIR, a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
does not necessarily present evidence of mental disease or defect, as
will be discussed in Part V of this Comment.
III. THE DIAGNOSIS AS AN EXCUSING CONDITION
A mere description of psychopathy does not explain why the indi-
vidual who receives such a diagnosis should be relieved of criminal
responsibility. Psychological expert testimony could be received to
identify the defendant as a psychopath, and yet, not tell the jury why
the defendant should not be held legally accountable for commission
of criminal acts.
Many mental health professionals attempt to justify their belief
that individuals diagnosed as psychopaths should be treated differ-
ently in the legal system by pointing to experimental evidence
designed to demonstrate that psychopaths are not "normal." For ex-
ample, there has been a variety of experimental research demonstrat-
ing that there may be a biological basis for psychopathic behavior.8 4 In
many experiments, psychopaths respond differently than control sub-
jects in a variety of experimental contexts. However, even if that ex-
perimental evidence is accepted as true, does that evidence present
anything more than the fact that there is an identifiable cause for the
behavior? Does this evidence explain why the behavior should be ex-
cused? Consider some of the psychological explanations for psychopa-
thy presented below.
A. Experimental Evidence that Psychopathic Behavior May Have
Identifiable Biological Causes
1. Brain Functioning
There is current evidence which would suggest that psychopaths
may be different from "normal" human beings ("normals") because of
organic differences in physiological functioning reflected in their
brain wave patterns. Electrical activity of the central nervous system
may be measured with the use of an electro-encephalogram ("EEG").
The devise allows researchers and physicians to record the occilatory
electric characteristics of the cortex of the brain.8 5 Many psychopaths
have abnormal EEG's. In a pioneering study during World War I1,
84. Caution should be used when evaluating the evidence on its merits. In the exper-
iments which demonstrate that sociopaths respond differently than normals in a
variety of experimental situations, the criteria for diagnosis varies from experi-
ment to experiment.
85. C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 63.
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Hill and Watterson8 6 investigated the EEG patterns of 151 male Brit-
ish military personnel who were not adjusting to military life. The
researchers divided the men into three groups: 1) aggressive psycho-
paths; 2) mixed psychopaths; and 3) inadequate psychopaths. A group
of normals was used as a control condition.8 7 The aggressive psycho-
paths closely resemble the current definition of psychopaths under
the DSM-IIIR.88 Sixty-five percent of the sixty-six aggressive psycho-
paths demonstrated abnormal EEG's compared to only fifteen percent
of a group of normals.
Many other EEG studies have followed. Subsequent studies have
been consistent in revealing a significantly higher amount of EEG ab-
normality in psychopaths.8 9 However, this type of research is difficult
to interpret because of the correlational nature of the studies. In cor-
relational research, cause and effect cannot be determined because
two events may occur simultaneously with neither causing the other.
The events may be caused by some third variable which is not being
measured. In the case of this research, it is difficult to determine
whether the EEG abnormalities cause the psychopathic behavior,
whether the behavior causes EEG abnormality, or whether there is
any causal relationship between the two.90
In addition to the abnormal EEG's during waking periods, there
has been some evidence that psychopaths exhibit an abnormal brain
rhythm during sleep. Highly aggressive individuals, including psycho-
paths, display spontaneous bursts of brain waves during otherwise
slow-wave activity.9 ' These brain wave bursts are called positive
spikes. Several researchers have suggested that positive spikes occur
with regularity in the EEG's of psychopaths who display explosive ag-
gressive behavior without feeling guilt but who are completely aware
of the violent act.92
86. Hill & Watterson, Electro-Encephalographic Studies of Psychopathic Personali-
ties, 5 J. NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 47 (1942).
87. The psychopathic groups, however, were not representative of Cleckley's criteria
of psychopathy but instead represented heterogenous clusters of personality dis-
orders. C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 65.
88. Id.
89. See eg., R. HAM supra note 40; Arthurs & Cahoon, A Clinical and Elec-
troencephalographic Survey of Psychopathic Personality, 120 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
875 (1964); Craft, The Meanings of the Term "Psychopath, " in PSYCHOPATHIC Dis-
ORDERS AND THEI AssEssMENT (M. Craft ed. 1966); Knott, Platt, Ashby, & Got-
tlieb, A Familial Evaluation of the Electroencephalogram of Patients with
Primary Behavior Disorder and Psychopathic Personality, 5 E.E.G. & CLINICAL
NEURoPHYSIOLoGy 363 (1953).
90. PSYCHOPATHIC BEHAVIOUR: APPROACHES TO RESEARCH (R. Hare & D. Schalling
eds. 1978).
91. Id. at 66.
92. See Kurland, Yeager, & Arthur, Physiologic Aspects of Severe Behavior Disor-
ders, 8 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 599 (1963). See generally IL HARE, supra note
40.
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Based on biological brain functioning research, some researchers
have argued that slow-wave activity represents delayed brain matura-
tion. This theory is called the maturation retardation hypothesis.9 3
This makes intuitive sense because the EEG patterns of many psycho-
paths resemble those of children, and it is arguable that the behavior
of the psychopath is immature and child like, i.e., self-centered,
impulsive. 94
2. Stimulation Seeking
A number of studies have suggested that the psychopath acts to
maximize exposure to stimulation.9 5 Stimulation in this context re-
,fers to the amount of sensation and/or information processed by the
cortex of the brain.96 Wiesen,97 for example, did an experiment in
which he found that psychopaths would work harder for exposure to
colored lights (visual stimulation) and exposure to radio music (audi-
tory stimulation) than a group of normals. A second experiment
found that normals worked harder than psychopaths to obtain three
seconds of silence and relative darkness.
A study by Orris98 found that psychopathic boys showed poorer
performance on a boring task requiring continuous attention. Instead,
psychopaths demonstrated a greater degree of participation in bore-
dom-relieving activities such as singing and talking to themselves.
A study by Chesno and Kilmann 9 tested the effects of aversive
white noise and shock on psychopaths and normals. The procedure
involved an avoidance learning task, with electric shock being admin-
istered for incorrect choices made by the subject. During the avoid-
ance learning task, subjects received either thirty-five, sixty-five, or
ninety-five decibels of white noise, ie., sounds like a hissing radiator
through earphones. The results of the study indicated that psycho-
paths made significantly more avoidance errors than the other groups
93. See R. HARE, supra note 40.
94. C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 65-66.
95. See, e.g., Hare & Thorvaldson, Psychopathy and Response to Electrical Stimula-
tion, 76 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 370 (1970); Thomas & McDonagh, Motiva-
tional Dominance in Psychopaths, 27 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 153 (1988).
96. Insufficient amounts of stimulation may lead to boredom. Boredom may be re-
duced by increasing stimulation, while exceptionally high levels of stimulation
may be relieved by avoiding further aversive stimulation to reduce arousal levels.
C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 68.
97. A. Wiesen, Differential Reinforcing Effects of Onset and Offset of Stimulation on
the Operant Behavior of Normals, Neurotics, and Psychopaths (doctoral disserta-
tion, University of Florida), cited in C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 67.
98. Orris, Visual Monitoring Performance in Three Subgroups of Male Delinquents,
74 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 227 (1969).
99. Chesno & Kilmann, Effects of Stimulation Intensity on Sociopathic Avoidance
Learning, 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 144 (1975)(psychopaths were classified
according to Cleckley's criteria).
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as the stimulation decreased, suggesting that they prefer punishment
to boredom.
With regard to stimulation seeking behavior, many theorists sug-
gest a biological basis for this behavior. These individuals believe that
the complex nerve network located in the central portion of the brain
stem called the reticular activating system ("RAS") is in some way
deficient.100 Either the RAS does not activate the cortex sufficiently
to receive the full impact of incoming information, or it adapts too
quickly, thus shutting the cortex activation down before receiving
complete information.' 0 ' The psychopath is unable to reach optimal
arousal levels with normal stimulation. Therefore, the psychopath en-
gages in thrill-seeking behavior in order to reach satisfying cortical
arousal. 0 2
3. Anxiety Reduction103
The autonomic nervous system controls heart rate, gland secretion,
and smooth muscle activity. 0 4 The autonomic nervous system is espe-
cially important because it activates emotional behavior and responds
to stress and tension. 05 The autonomic nervous system can be divided
into the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. 0 6 The
sympathetic nervous system activates the "fight or flight" mechanism
during a fearful or emergency situation. 07 The parasympathetic sys-
tem relaxes the individual after the fearful or emergency situation. 08
The most common measure of emotional arousal has been the skin
conductance, or galvanic skin response. 09 The skin conductance re-
sponse ("SCR") is a measure of the resistance of the skin to con-
ducting electrical current.11 0 Sweating, for example, corresponds
closely to changes in emotional states and has, therefore, been found
to be a highly sensitive indicator of even slight changes in the auto-
nomic nervous system."' Skin conductance increases as emotional
arousal, e.g., anxiety or fear, increases. Perspiration changes can be
100. C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 69.
101. Id. at 69-70.
102. Id. at 70.
103. For additional studies involving anxiety reduction, see, ag., Newman & Kosson,
Passive Avoidance Learning in Psychopathic and Nonpsychopathic Offenders, 95
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 252 (1986); Sterling & Edelmann, Reactions to Anger
and Anxiety-Provoking Events: Psychopathic and Nonpsychopathic Groups
Compared, 44 J. CimCAL PSYCHOLOGY 96 (1988).
104. C. BARTOL, supra note 30, at 71.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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detected by recording devises such as polygraphs or physiographs.1 12
Lykkenll3 hypothesized that since the psychopath is anxiety-free,
the psychopath should have difficulty in learning to avoid unpleasant
situations that would cause anxiety in normals. Lykken exposed sub-
jects to an electronic maze in which they were given four choices, of
which only one was the correct choice. One of the incorrect alterna-
tives would give the subject an electric shock. Lykken was interested
in discovering how quickly subjects learned to avoid the electric shock.
Avoidance learning would be rewarded by the reduction of anxiety
upon encountering the point at which the psychopaths must make a
choice of which path of the maze to take.
Lykken measured skin conductance changes in subjects prior to
the maze portion of the experiment. During this time, subjects would
hear a buzzer and receive an electric shock after the buzzing sound.
Eventually, the buzzer became associated with the shock. The onset
of the buzzer produced an anxiety response in normal individuals in
anticipation of the shock, and thus, resulted in an increase in skin
conductance.
The psychopaths, however, did not seek to avoid the electric shocks
in the maze experiment, and in the pre-experiment measure, psycho-
path's skin conductance was considerably less than that of normals
when they heard the buzzer and anticipated the shock. Psychopaths
are either unable to learn to avoid the shock, as the experimenters
suggested, or they may simply see no need to avoid shock, particularly
if they do not find the shock aversive.1 14
A second study using Lykken's basic procedure and apparatus was
performed by Schachter and Latanel15 in which each subject was run
through a maze two times. The first time the subjects were run
through the maze with an injection of a harmless saline solution, and
the second time subjects were given an injection of adrenaline, a hor-
112. Id. at 72.
113. Lykken, A Study of Anxiety in the Sociopathic Personality, 55 J. ABNORMAL &
Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 6 (1957).
114. For additional studies that demonstrate that psychopaths display smaller in-
creases in skin conductance than nonpsychopaths, see Hare, Temporal Gradient
of Fear Arousal in Psychopaths, 70 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 442 (1965); Hare &
Craigen, Psychopathy and Physiological Activity in a Mixed-Motive Game Situa-
tion, 11 PsYCHoPiysIOLoGY 197 (1974); Hare, Frazelle & Cox, Psychopathy and
Physiological Responses to Threat of an Aversive Stimulus, 15 PSYCHOPHYSIOL-
OGY 165 (1978); Hare & Quinn, Psychopathy and Autonomic Condition, 77 J. AB-
NORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 223 (1971); Ogloff & Wong, Electrodermal &
Cardiovascular Evidence of a Coping Response in Psychopaths, 17 CRIMINAL
JUST. & BEHAV. 231 (1990); Tharp, Maltzman, Syndulko & Ziskind, Autonomic
Activity During Anticipation of an Aversive Tone in Noninstitutionalized Soci-
opaths, 17 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 123 (1980). See also R. HARE, supra note 40.
115. Schacter & Latane, Crime, Cognition and Autonomic Nervous System, in 12 NE-
BRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 221 (1964).
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mone that stimulates physiological arousal. The experiment revealed
that injections of adrenaline dramatically improved the performance
of the psychopath in the avoidance learning task compared to those
who just received the saline. Thus, the researchers speculated that
the drug raised the psychopath's emotional arousal to those zf normals
so that they could function in the learning task.116
B. Other Explanations for the Disorder
Past research has tried to find a biological rationale for psycho-
pathic behavior.117 However, many contemporary researchers have
focused on social-learning theories to explain the psychopath's behav-
ior.1 18 Behaviorists and social learning theorists emphasize the par-
ents' reinforcement and punishment practices, as well as the parents'
116. Other research has examined cardiovascular indicators of emotional arousal. For
example, Hare & Craigen, supra note 114, performed an experiment in which a
tone preceded an electric shock by about ten seconds. In anticipation of the
shock, psychopaths exhibited a rapid acceleration of heart beat, followed by a
rapid deceleration of heart rate immediately before the onset of the shock. In
contrast the normals' heart rates only gradually increased in anticipation of the
shock. Hare and Craigen suggest that the accelerated heart response may help
the psychopath to modulate the emotional impact of noxious stimuli. See also
Hare, Frazelle & Cox, supra note 114.
117. There are other biological explanations than the ones presented in this Com-
ment. See, e.g., Devonshire, Howard & Sellars, Frontal Lobe Functions and Per-
sonality in Mentally Abnormal Offenders, 9 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL
DIMFERENCFS 339 (1988); Elliot, Neuroanatomy and Neurology of Aggression"
Treatment of Aggressive Disorders, 17 PSYcBiATRIc ANNALS 385 (1987)(role of
neurotransmitters); Howard, Psychopathy: A Psychobiological Perspective, 7
PERSONALITY & INDIvIDuAL DIFFERENCES 795 (1986); Jutai, Hare & Connolly,
Psychopathy and Event-Related Brain Potentials (ERPs) Associated with Atten-
tion to Speech Stimuli, 8 PERSONALrTY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 175
(1987)(low left hemisphere arousal); Lidberg, Modin, Oreland, Tuck & Gillner,
Platelet Monoamine Oxidase Activity and Psychopathy, 16 PSYCHIATRY RE-
sEARcH 339 (1985); Loehlin, Willerman & Horn, Human Behavior Genetics, 39
ANNUAL REv. PsYHoLoGy 101 (1988); Miller, Neuropsychology of the Aggressive
Psychopath. An Integrative Review, 13 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 119 (1987)(frontal
lobe and left hemisphere dysfunction); Sutker, Moan & Allain, Assessment of
Cognitive Control in Psychopathic and Normal Prisoners, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL As-
SESSMENT 275 (1983)(frontal lobe malfunction); Virkkunen, Horrobin, Jenkins &
Manku, Plasma Phospholipid Essential Fatty Acids and Prostaglandins in Alco-
holic, Habitually Violent and Impulsive Offenders, 22 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
1087 (1987).
118. There have been other explanations for sociopathic behavior such as Sigmund
Freud's psychoanalytic explanation. For a short discussion of Freud's view of
psychopathy, see Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 83, at 421-22. There are also
genetic theories of sociopathy. See, ag., MacMillan & Kofoed, Sociobiology and
Antisocial Personality: An Alternative Perspective, 172 J. NERvous & MENTAL
DISEASE 701 (1984). However, the most prominent theories in the psychological
literature today are the biological and social-learning theories. Therefore, the
other theories will not be discussed further.
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behavior and attitudes.119
Early investigators considered rejection, usually by mothers, as a
causal factor in the development of psychopathy.120 Later investiga-
tors also emphasized rejection by fathers as such a factor.121 Another
investigator found that psychopathic children experience emotional
deprivation and neglect, and thus, they have little opportunity to learn
socially desirable behavior from adult models.12 2
In an early study by McCord, McCord and Zola, 23 the researchers
found parental conflict, cruelty, erratic punishment and neglect in the
psychopaths' homes.124 Other studies have shown that inconsistent
discipline by parents is a common fact of life for psychopaths. 25 Not
only is the punishment inconsistent, but it is often harsh.12 6 It is
thought that once inconsistent punishment becomes ineffectual, the
parents increase the intensity of the punishment. 27
119. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 83, at 422.
120. See Haler, Some Factors Related to the Adjustment of Psychopaths on Parole
from a State Hospital, 13 SMITH C. STUD. Soc. WORK 193 (1942); Knight, A De-
scriptive Comparison of Markedly Aggressive and Submissive Children, 4 SMITH
C. STuD. Soc. WORK 168 (1933); Partridge, A Study of50 Cases of Psychopathic
Personality, 7 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 953 (1928).
121. See R. LINDNER, REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE: THE HYPOANALYSIS OF A CRIMINAL
PSYCHOPATH (1944); Greenacre, Conscience in the Psychopath, 15 AM. J. ORTHo-
PSYCHIATRY 495 (1945); Szurek, Notes on the Genesis of Psychopathic Personality
Trends, 5 PSYCHIATRY 1 (1942).
122. Bender, Psychopathic Behavior Disorders in Children, in HANDBOOK OF CORREC-
TIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 360-77 (R. Lindner & R. Seliger eds. 1947). See also Bowlby,
Ainsworth, Boston & Rosenbluth, The Effects of Mother-Child Separation.: A Fol-
low-Up Study, 29 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1956); Davis, Extreme Social
Isolation of A Child, 45 AM. J. Soc. 554 (1940).
123. W. MCCORD, J. MCCORD & I. ZOLA, ORIGINS OF CRIME (1959).
124. See Bland & Orn, Family Violence and Psychiatric Disorder, 31 CAN. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 129 (1986); Earls, Reich, Jung & Cloninger, Psychopathology in Children of
Alcoholic and Antisocial Parents, 12 ALCOHOLISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
RES. 481 (1988); Lahey, Hardagen, Frick, McBurnett, Connor & Hynd, Conduct
Disorder: Parsing the Cofounded Relation to Parental Divorce and Antisocial
Personality, 97 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 334 (1988); Reich, The Relationship
Between Early Life Events and DSM-III Personality Disorders, 8 HILLSIDE J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 164 (1986); Rutter, Psychopathology and Development-
Childhood Antecedents of Adult Psychiatric Disorder, 18 AUSTRALIAN & NEw
ZEALAND J. PSYCHIATRY 225 (1984).
125. See R. ANDREY, DELINQUENCY AND PARENTAL PATHOLOGY (1960); I. BENNETT,
DELINQUENT AND NEUROTIC CHILDREN (1960); Snyder, Reinforcement Analysis
of Interaction in Problem and Nonproblem Families, 86 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL-
OGY 528 (1977). See also W. McCORD & J. MCCoRD, THE PSYCHOPATH: AN ESSAY
ON THE CRIMINAL MIND (1964).
126. See D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN (1970).
127. See Jacob, Family Interaction in Disturbed and Normal Families: A Methodolog-
ical and Substantive Review, 82 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 33 (1975); Patterson, The
Aggressive Child: Victim and Architect of a Coercive System, in 1 BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION AND FAMILIES: THEORY AND RESEARCH (E. Mash, L. Hamerlynck
& L. Handy eds. 1976).
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The inconsistent administration of punishment should either
render events irrelevant or shape them into signals for oppositional
behavior.2 If the child is beaten and verbally abused when he or she
is "good" and "bad," the punishment does not serve to differentiate
between proper and improper behavior. 2 9 The child will see no ad-
vantage in behaving in appropriate ways. 30 The negative conse-
quences of such actions will not influence the individual's choice of
behavior except to elicit opposition.' 3 ' In addition, if the punishment
is excessive, the individual will gradually become desensitized to its
effects, and thus, the punishment will no longer be able to alter
behavior.132
From this type of childhood experience, an adult would be ex-
pected to be insensitive to both verbal and physical punishment and be
less responsive to socially provocative feedback.133 Furthermore, be-
cause of the inconsistency in punishment and reward, it would be ex-
pected that psychopaths would only engage in positive and refrain
from negative behavior when the consequences of 'their actions are
immediate.34
Given the family history of psychopaths, it might-also be expected
that these individuals will begin to exhibit oppositional acts in re-
sponse to the inconsistent and abusive parental behavior. 3 5 Although
punishment may be forthcoming, one researcher suggests that parents
may withhold punishment if the child either promises not to do it
again, feigns repentance, or offers a seemingly plausible, but false, ex-
planation. 3 6 When the authority figure withholds punishment, he or
she reinforces the untruthful and superficial behavior of the child.1s7
In addition to erratic punishment, parents often are inconsistent in
128. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 83, at 427.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 427-28.
135. Marshall & Barbaree have recognized the legal implications of this response:
[A]t least one of the motivating factors in criminal behavior [may] be
some form of this oppositional disposition. After all, society has essen-
tially taken over the role of the parents, and, from the perspective of the
offender, this "society" may be considered to be behaving in much the
same way. The psychopath may see society as being inconsistent in met-
ing out punishment and, indeed, it has often been observed that the law
deals quite inconsistently with different kinds of offenses and differen-
tially with individuals of different ethnic or socioeconomic backgrounds
who have been charged with similar offenses.
Id. at 428 (citations omitted).
136. B. MAHEi, PRINCIPLEs oF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY (1966).
137. Id.
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dealing affectionately with these children.138 Individuals with antiso-
cial personalities experience few consistent and supportive affection-
ate relationships when they are young, so they do not have the
opportunity to model appropriate interpersonal behavior.139 Thus,
psychopaths learn to be self-interested and may fail to respond to
others in emotionally appropriate ways because others serve as no
source of reinforcement to them. 40
C. A Response to the Causal Explanations of Psychopathy
From psychological literature, it seems clear that psychopathy has
a distinct set of characteristics, and its origin may have a biological or
social cause. Some psychologists believe that because of the causal ori-
gin of sociopathy, whatever that cause may be, an individual diagnosed
as having this condition should be excused from criminal responsibil-
ity.141 Psychopathy becomes an excusing condition because the indi-
vidual has become "ill" for specific reasons. The illness may result
from improper social development, e.g., parental abuse, poor parent-
ing, or biological causes. 142
138. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 83, at 428.
139. Id. Modeling has been shown to be important in child development. See, eg., A.
BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY (1977); A. BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A So-
CIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973).
140. Yet, the psychopath may be able to discern others' feelings well enough to charm
and manipulate them. For example, a man with the antisocial personality disor-
der may live with a woman in order to take advantage of her money and home, all
the while displaying appropriate charm and affection. However, there is some
question whether this is real affection or just feigned affection designed to get
what he wants. The problem may be that the sociopath may have some degree of
empathy, while at the same time having social skills he may use to his advantage;
or it may be that empathy has little to do with the accurate person perception
required of successful manipulators. Marshall & Barbaree, supra note 83, at 429-
30.
141. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 14, at 192. See also I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANrrY (1962); Jeffrey, Criminology As an Inter-
disciplinary Behavioral Science, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 149 (1978), reprinted in BIOL-
OGY, CRIME AND ETICS 44 (F. Marsh & J. Katz eds. 1985)(new model of
criminology must emphasize elements of prevention, physical environment, and a
biosocial model of learning). C. Hare & McPherson, Violent Aggressive Behav-
ior by Criminal Psychopaths, 7 INT'L J.L. PSYCHIATRY 35 (1984)(criminal psycho-
paths commit three and one-half times more violent crimes than non-
psychopaths).
142. Many mental health professionals believe that diseases of the body and diseases
of the mind or emotions are truly analogous. See Diamond, supra note 14, at 192-
93. When the disease model is used, all "symptoms" which can properly receive a
diagnosis under the DSM-IIIR are regarded as mental diseases. Thus, the soci-
opath, no less than the schizophrenic, is to be regarded as having mental abnor-
malities. The medical model poses serious problems for the legal system.
Psychiatric diagnoses may be given to sets of behavior that should not be excul-
pating, but the psychiatrist does not recognize the distinction between these diag-
noses because he or she views all diagnostic categories as representing "diseases."
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One commentator predicted:
[W]ithin ten years biochemical and psychological tests will be developed that
will demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a substantial number of our
worst and most vicious criminal offenders are actually the sickest of all. And
that if the concept of mental disease and exculpation from responsibility ap-
plies at all, it will apply most appropriately to them. And further, that it will
apply equally to the vast horde of minor, habitual, aggressive offenders who
form the great bulk of the recidivists. The law and the public, whether they
like it or not, will be forced by the stark proof of scientific demonstration to
accept the fact that large numbers of individuals who now receive the full,
untempered blow of social indignation, ostracism, vengeance, and ritualized
judicial murder are sick and helpless victims of psychological and physical dis-
ease of the mind and brain.1 4 3
Yet, even if physical causes were to be found for the antisocial person-
ality disorder, would this finding "force us, as a society, to conclude
that antisocial personality meets the mental disease threshold of legal
insanity?"144
Regardless of whether a biological or other social-environmental
cause1 45 may be involved, a causal analysis of sociopathy is improper
with respect to legal responsibility. The confusion results from the
fact that if physical or social causes of behavior are discovered, the
actor is automatically exculpated. 4 6
The chain of reasoning is that if one has a "disease" which causes him or her to
act criminally, the fact that he or she has a "disease" should be the reason for
exoneration without regard to society's view of the manifestation of that "dis-
ease."
This view stems from the idea that all mental illness has a neurological cause.
In the early part of this century, psychiatry was a sub-specialty of neurology. Em-
phasis was placed on overt, demonstrable evidence of mental disease, eg., halluci-
nations, in the hope that exact descriptions of such overt disease manifestations
would eventually result in an ability to catalogue mental disease with the specific-
ity common to medical science. Id. at 194. Neurologists had been able to demon-
strate that discrete neurological diseases had been caused by specific brain
lesions, and it was anticipated that the same would be accomplished with mental
illness. Id. at 195.
Psychiatrists continue to do a variety of tests that are designed to reveal an
organic, neuro-psychological disease of the brain, which might cause sociopaths to
behave in antisocial ways. Many psychiatrists want to demonstrate that the soci-
opath's "appearance of normalcy, their apparent ability to exercise free will,
choice, and decision (and somehow invariably choose the wrong instead of the
right) is purely a facade, an artifact that conceals the extent to which they are
victims of their own brain pathology." Id. at 198 (footnote omitted). See also Wel-
ler, supra note 3, at 140 (stating that "acknowledgement of an organic basis, at
least in some cases, could alter public and legal attitudes").
143. Diamond, supra note 14, at 198 (footnote omitted).
144. Bursten, What if Antisocial Personality is an Illness?, 10 BuLL. Am. AcAD. Psy-
CHIATRY & L., 97, 99 (1982).
145. See supra notes 85-140 and accompanying text.
146. Moore, Legal Conceptions of Mental Illness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUB-
Lic PoucY 25, 34 (B. Brody & H. Engelhardt eds. 1980). Of course, whether the
actor actually will be exculpated will depend upon whether he or she meets the
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The biological and social theories discussed above imply that the
resulting antisocial behavior was either caused respectively by organic
brain problems or social factors such as bad parenting. These theories
presuppose that all behavior can be explained according to some prin-
ciple, either discoverable at the present time or discoverable in the
future. Implicit in this principle is the notion that the resulting behav-
ior was "determined" by either the biological or social phenomena.
Causal determinist theories have used psychological explanations
as a basis for excuse without sufficiently explaining what makes a psy-
chological problem any more excusing than other causal factors. One
such factor might be poverty, in the case of a robbery committed to get
money to pay bills. Causal determinist theories subscribe to the view
that human behavior is causally necessitated by antecedent events ac-
cording to law-like generalizations. 4 7 For example, biological causal
theories posit that behavior can be primarily explained by the work-
ings of the brain and the endocrine and nervous systems, which oper-
ate on chemical and biological principles.148
The difficulty with this deterministic or causal view is that if it
were followed to its logical conclusion, no one would ever be responsi-
ble for his or her actions because all behavior is "caused."14 9 Yet, no
one would argue that the "typical" defendant charged with robbery
should be excused because he or she can point to poverty as the reason
that he or she stole ten thousand dollars to pay off gambling debts, to
buy a car, or to provide for a sick grandmother.
However, if this defendant was atypical and stated, "I robbed the
bank because God told me to take the money and give it to the poor,"
one might be inclined to excuse this defendant. One would say that
this defendant was "crazy," if he or she was having conversations with
God, and that by virtue of the mental impairment, this defendant
should be excused from criminal liability. However, what is it about
this mental condition that should result in differential treatment in
the legal system? Why should this defendant and other such individ-
uals be excused from legal accountability?
Causal determinist theories clearly do not provide answers to such
questions. If causal determinist theories were to be taken literally,
both the poverty-ridden robber who wants to pay off gambling debts
other substantive criteria of the test. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (proposed Offi-
cial Draft 1962).
147. Cf. Morse, Psychology, Determinism, & Legal Responsibility, in 33 NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 35, 43 (1985) (social psychological explanations that
explain deviant behavior).
148. Id. at 56-61.
149. Id. at 44-45. See also Kierulff, Sheep in the Midst of Wolves: Personal.Responsi.
bility Therapy with Criminal Personalities, 19 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY RES. & PRAc.
436, 438 (1988)(the law treats even those criminal acts that are necessitated by
psychological compulsion as resulting from the exercise of free will).
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and the robber who took instruction directly from God would have to
be excused from liability because their behavior was "caused" by
something.
To say that psychopathy has causes does not specifically state why,
or if, it should be a condition which, even if the other substantive crite-
ria of the Model Penal Code test were met, should be excused from
legal responsibility.1 5 0 As will be discussed in Part IV, another con-
ception of responsibility must be established in order to evaluate why
certain types of mental impairments should operate as excusing condi-
tions. In Part V, sociopathy will be addressed as a possible excusing
condition and will be shown to be an improper subject for the insanity
defense.
IV. A LEGAL CONCEPTION OF "MENTAL
DISEASE OR DEFECT"
Certain types of mental disorders provide intuitively clear cases for
exculpation. Consider the following example:
A experiences delusions of persecution and grandiosity, and he receives
hallucinatory commands from the voice of God. He is convinced that he is the
second coming of Christ and that only he can prevent nuclear holocaust. He
also believes that Satan is trying to kill him in order to prevent him from
saving the world. In response to a hallucinatory divine command, he shoots a
salesman who comes to his door, convinced that the salesman is an agent of
Satan who is there to prevent him from saving the world.1 5 1
What is it about A's hallucinations that makes him blameless in the
resulting murder? Although one could say that the murder was
caused by hallucinatory thoughts, that does not explain what it is
about hallucinatory thoughts that somehow makes him incapable of
being criminally responsible. To say that the murder was caused by
hallucinatory thoughts does not distinguish A from B, a woman who
simply kills the salesman because she did not like the salesman and
did not want to be bothered with buying a vacuum cleaner at that
time. In the case of both A and B, the resulting murder was caused by
some thought pattern in the defendants' minds. If the causal deter-
minist theories' 52 discussed in Part I above were accepted, both A
150. According to MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1), "[a] person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrong-
fulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law."
Almost certainly, the expert testifying will be able to link the "mental illness" to
the crime and, in addition, will be able to describe to the jury the psychopath's
inability to control his or her behavior. Thus, almost by virtue of the diagnosis,
the rest of the Model Penal Code test can be supported.
151. Schopp, Depression, the Insanity Defense, and Civil Commitment- Foundations
in Autonomy and Resonsibility, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 81 (1989).
152. One legal test that adopts a causal determinist perspective is the irresistible im-
pulse test. See, eg., Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 597, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887).
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and B would have to be exonerated, because A and B would be treated
as if they could not have acted otherwise. Yet, in practice, it is un-
likely that B would be exonerated. Rather, B would be treated as a
"self-conscious being" who acted for specific reasons.153
A "normal" human being is believed to be an autonomous being
who possesses the "ability to understand, reason, and direct his or her
actions through reasoned choice. These capacities allow him to par-
ticipate effectively in a cooperative social system in light of the appli-
cable norms, facts, and reasonable expectations."154 Normals possess
the ability to understand what they are doing and the consequences of
their actions. Normals think about their actions and reason that a par-
ticular act is appropriate under the circumstances. Normals have rea-
sons for their actions which are logical. Further, normals are not
coerced or pressured, but choose to commit any given act. Thus, the
normal individual is held criminally liable for his or her actions. How-
ever, when a person is unable to understand, reason, and direct his or
her actions through reasoned choice, that person may not be held
criminally liable. A person's inability to understand, reason, and di-
rect his or her actions through reasoned choice, may be thought of as a
mental impairment.155
Having this type of mental impairment, an individual should not be
held criminally responsible. Rather than speaking in terms of causal-
ity that do nothing to explain the "why's" of excuse, but rather are
conclusory, this conception of mental impairment as a basis for excuse
posits that there is some impairment in rational thought processes
that renders the person unable to make autonomous choices.156
If this conception of mental impairment was to be used to define
the legal phrase "mental disease or defect," psychological testimony
used to present an insanity defense could address the defendant's irra-
tional thoughts or behavior. The ALl does not give any specific gui-
dance in understanding what the phrase "mental disease or defect"
153. Morse, supra note 147, at 49.
154. Schopp, supr note 151, at 90.
155. Many believe that the capacity to understand and reason is a necessary condition
for criminal liability because the criminal law is intended to deter proscribed be-
havior. If individuals are unable to make choices based on rational reasoning,
they may be undeterrable. See A. GoLnSTEIN, THE INsANrrY DEFENsE 11-15
(1967).
156. This is particularly true for the M'Naghten test of insanity which requires the
accused to be suffering from such a "defect of reason, from the disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Regina v.
M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). Nevertheless, concern for the impair-
ment in rational thought processes is implicit in the Model Penal Code test that
incorporates the accused's inability to appreciate the criminality of his or her con-
duct in the test. The inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of criminal conduct
certainly relates to an accused's rationality.
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should mean. 157 However, the above conception of mental impair-
ment could be applied to the phrase "mental disease or defect." A
concise method for applying the concept as a useful test has been de-
veloped by Michael Moore.-5 8 Under Moore's theory, a person can
only be held criminally responsible if he or she is a rational agent.
Only if the person acts to achieve some intelligible end in light of some
rational beliefs will he or she be seen as responsible.159
Moore states that the unintelligibility of the actions of mentally ill
persons stems from the fact that the actions of the mentally ill cannot
be explained by the following practical syllogism:
(1) Agent X wants result R to obtain; (2) X believes that in situation S
action A will cause R to obtain, and that he is in situation S; (3) if X believes
thatA will result in R, and if X desires R, then ceteris oaribus, Xwill do A; (4)
ceteris paribus. Therefore, X does A. In other words, we need to know: (1)
what the agent wanted, (2) what he believed about the situation and his ability
to achieve through action what he wanted. In addition, we need to know (3)
that he is a rational creature (that is, other things being equal, one who will
act so as to further his desires in light of his beliefs), and (4) that the agent
does not have desires and beliefs that conflict with the desires and beliefs on
which he is about to act.1 6 0
Moore explains his syllogism and how it applies to mental illness in
the following terms. For some cases, it may be that there is no set of
beliefs or desires by which an action can be seen as rational. For ex-
ample, epileptics during a seizure seem to be engaged in nonrational
activities in this sense. They will jerk in motions that are not directed
by any conscious thought processes. These motions constitute invol-
untary actions caused by spasms and reflexes.16'
In addition, to say that an individual's actions are irrational may be
to look beyond the individual's actual goal. Although actions them-
selves may appear to be rational, when one looks at the specific rea-
sons for the actions, the actions become irrational.162 Moore gives
another example: If a woman believes she is made of glass, she may
avoid physical contact with other people because she believes she will
shatter if "touched. This avoidance may seem rational in light of her
157. A court could give the jury a definition for mental disease or defect. For exam-
ple, in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court devel-
oped a specific definition which would aid a jury in determining whether the
defendant had a mental disease or defect. According to the court, a "mental dis-
ease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior con-
trols." Id. at 983. However, this definition still gives considerable deference to
medical testimony. Thus, another definition of mental disease or defect is
desirable.
158. Moore, supra note 146, at 58-61.
159. Id. at 61.
160. Id. at 58-59.
161. Id. at 59.
162. Id.
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goal to prevent being shattered, but the belief that she will shatter is
itself irrational. Actions predicated on irrational beliefs are them-
selves irrational.163
Further, the individual may be deemed to act irrationally because
it is not intelligible to others that one could want what the agent ap-
parently wants. To be a proper motive for action, a consequence must
be intelligible as an object of desire in a given culture.164 Moore gives
an example of a man carrying books up the stairs because he wants to
put the books in his library "on the roof." Such a goal is unintelligible,
i.e., no one has a library on the roof.165
Moore contends that the fourth premise of the syllogism is rarely
satisfied in cases of mental illness. He states that most of the desires
of a mentally ill person are unconscious, and, as such, cannot be re-
solved into a "coherent, consistent set of wants."1 66 Although the
"normal" individual may have inconsistent desires, i.e., to lose weight
and yet to eat a piece of chocolate cake, the "normal" individual recog-
nizes those desires and tries to consciously resolve these conflicts.
When an individual's actions become irrational, i.e., when some sig-
nificant portion of his or her actions pursue ends that are unintel-
ligible in light of societal norms and expectations, when the actions
are predicated on beliefs that are irrational, or when the actions are
based on gross inconsistences of desires or beliefs or perhaps are not
based on desire or belief sets at all, the individual's mental incapacities
are labeled a "mental illness." Moore summarized: "Rationality is the
fundamental premise by virtue of which we understand ourselves as
human beings; that is, as creatures capable of adjusting their actions as
reasonably efficient means to intelligible ends. Being mentally ill
means being incapacitated from acting rationally in this fundamental
sense."167
If Moore's definition of the type of mental impairment that should
afford exculpation were combined with the language of the Model Pe-
nal Code, the jury would have to initially determine whether the de-
fendant suffers from a "mental disease or defect." This would require
a finding of irrationality in the sense described above.
In the hypothetical case of A who killed the door-to-door salesman
because he believed the salesman was an agent of Satan,168 a jury
could easily find that A suffered from a "mental disease or defect" by
applying Moore's syllogism. A fails at least two of the parts of the
syllogism. First, A's goal of saving the world because he is the second
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 60.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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Christ may be seen as irrational. Irrationality must be tested in light
of "applicable norms, facts, and reasonable expectations."169 Many
Christians have a certain expectation about what the second coming
will be like; that is, the second coming will not be for the purpose of
saving the world from nuclear holocaust but will instead be to claim
the remaining souls for the kingdom of heaven. Thus, A's goal of be-
lieving that as Christ he will save the world from nuclear holocaust is
inconsistent with applicable norms and expectations. Therefore, this
belief may be seen as irrational.
Second, if it were true that this salesman were an agent of Satan
trying to prevent A from saving the world, it would be perfectly logi-
cal for A to kill him so that he could achieve his goal of preventing
nuclear holocaust. However, the simple fact is that this salesman is
not an agent of Satan but is probably just an agent of the Acme Vac-
uum Cleaner Company. A's actions are only rational if they are
viewed in the light of the facts and circumstances as A sees them.
A's case is an easy one. It is intuitively appealing because most
people, without necessarily having to consult a psychiatrist, would
agree that there is something "not quite right" about A.170
However, what happens in a not-so-clear case of mental impair-
ment is a question that still remains. Is psychopathy a condition, like
A's problems, that can be clearly seen as a "mental disease or defect?"
Whether a jury should find that a psychopath suffers from a "mental
disease or defect" is discussed in Part V.
V. SHOULD PSYCHOPATHY BE SEEN AS A "MENTAL
DISEASE OR DEFECT?"
Psychopaths have enjoyed a colorful status among medical profes-
sionals and, in turn, among legalists.171 In Washington, D.C., when
the Durham test of insanity was widely used,172 psychiatrists from St.
Elizabeth's Hospital were often called to testify about defendants'
mental conditions with regard to the applicability of the insanity de-
fense. The staff at St. Elizabeth's made a policy decision that psycho-
pathic personality disturbances would not be regarded as mental
illnesses within the meaning of the Durham rule.173 Yet, three years
later, St. Elizabeth's policy was changed to allow psychiatric testimony
that the psychopathic personality disturbance should be considered a
mental disease for legal purposes.174
169. Schopp, supra note 151, at 90.
170. See id. at 81-82.
171. Moore, supm note 146, at 37-39. See also Bursten, supra note 144, at 98 (discuss-
ing lack of scientific guidelines for determining what is or is not a mental illness).
172. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the Durham test.
173. Moore, supra note 146, at 37-38.
174. Id. Because of the policy change, a court even granted an individual a new trial
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appeared to will-
ingly give the power to determine which types of mental illnesses
would suffice for exculpation under the insanity defense to the psychi-
atrists at St. Elizabeth's Hospital. The court stated:
Mental "disease" means mental illness. Mental illnesses are of many sorts
and have many characteristics. They, like physical illnesses, are the subject
matter of medical science....
Many psychiatrists had come to understand there was a "legal insanity"
different from any clinical mental illness. That of course was not true in a
juridical sense. The law has no separate concept of a legally acceptable ail-
ment which per se excuses the sufferer from criminal liability. The problems
of the law in these cases are whether a person has committed a specific crimi-
nal act... was suffering from a mental disease, that is, from a medically recog-
nized illness of the mind .... 175
However, the court later noted that it had granted power to the
hospital to "alter drastically the scope of a rule of law."176 The reason
the court made this "illegitimate transfer" of power to psychiatrists to
decide the meaning of a legal rule of criminal responsibility was be-
cause the court incorrectly interpreted the term "mental illness" as a
medical concept. The court further noted that what psychiatrists may
consider a "mental disease or defect" for treatment purposes may or
may not be the same as "mental disease or defect" for the jury's pur-
pose of determining criminal responsibility.177
Although a psychiatric conception of mental illness may not be suf-
ficient to negate criminal liability, what type of "mental disease or de-
fect" should exonerate an individual?178 As discussed above, the
reason "normal" people are held responsible for their actions is be-
cause they are seen as autonomous, rational agents. For certain peo-
ple to be exculpated, they would have to be individuals who suffer
from an inability "to understand, reason, and direct [their] actions
through reasoned choice."179 If Moore's test for irrationality, which is
based upon a conception of human beings as autonomous, were applied
to psychopathy, would psychopathy properly be considered a "mental
disease or defect"?
From the DSM-IIIR diagnostic description of a psychopath, it
would appear that the psychopath is not suffering from irrationality in
because he was deprived of "a verdict based upon the most mature expert opinion
available on an issue vital to his defense." Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572,
573 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
175. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957)(emphasis added).
176. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 860 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
177. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also T.
GUNTHEIL & P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
278-80, 282-83 (1982).
178. Recall that the term "mental disease or defect" is not specifically defined by the
AL. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179. Schopp, supra note 151, at 90.
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any of the senses Moore would see as exculpatory conditions. Accord-
ing to the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-IIIR, the psychopath is iden-
tified as being at least eighteen years old; having had the onset of his
problem before age fifteen with no intervening problem-free period of
five years or more; and having had no evidence of mental retardation,
schizophrenia, or mania. These criteria also describe the psychopath
as having at least four of the following- 1) inability to sustain consis-
tent employment; 2) inability to function as an effective parent; 3) fail-
ure to accept social norms evidenced by persistent criminal behavior;
4) inability to maintain enduring sexual/affectionate relations; 5) irri-
tability and aggressiveness; 6) failure to honor financial obligations; 7)
impulsivity; 8) disregard for the truth, including conning others for
profit; 9) recklessness; and 10) lack of remorse.1 8 0 Judging from the
diagnostic criteria for determining whether an individual is a soci-
opath, there is no requirement of irrational thinking patterns and no
requirement of irrational actions. While it may be socially unaccept-
able to be a poor employee in light of the American work ethic, violate
the law, engage in bigamy or adultery, be aggressive, renege on debts,
be impulsive rather than a careful planner, lie, or be reckless, such
traits in and of themselves are not "irrational."
An example of a clinically diagnosed psychopath would be useful
here to contrast the clinical view with what the legal view should be:
Donald S., 30 years old, has just completed a three-year prison term for
fraud, bigamy, false pretenses, and escaping lawful custody. The circum-
stances leading up to these offenses are interesting and consistent with his
past behavior. With less than a month left to serve on an earlier 18-month
term for fraud, he faked illness and escaped from the prison hospital. During
the ten months of freedom that followed he engaged in a variety of illegal
enterprises; the activity that resulted in his recapture was typical of his
method of operation. By passing himself off as the "field executive" of an
international philanthropic foundation, he was able to enlist the aid of several
religious organizations in a fund-raising campaign. The campaign moved
slowly at first, and in an attempt to speed things up, he arranged an interview
with the local TV station. His performance during the interview was so im-
pressive that funds started to pour in. However, unfortunately for Donald,
the interview was also carried on a national news network. He was recognized
180. DSM-IIIR, suprm note 75, at 342-46. It should be noted that a great deal of contro-
versy exists surrounding the diagnostic criteria for psychopathy. See Hare, Diag-
noais of Antisocial Personality Disorder in Two Prison Populations, 140 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 887 (1983); Hare, A Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy
in Criminal Populations, 1 PERSONALrrY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 111 (1980).
In fact, the bulk of the psychological literature indicates that the DSM-IIIR ap-
proach is wrong. Other diagnostic techniques such as the use of the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MIMPI) or Hare's Psychopathy Checklist can
be used that may, in fact, be more descriptive of the psychopath's behavior. See
Hare, Comparison of Procedures for the Assessment of Psychopathy, 53 J. CON-
suLTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 7 (1985) [hereinafter Assessment of Psychopa-
thy]. Nevertheless, the DSM-IIIR is widely accepted and is used by the court
system.
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and quickly arrested. During the ensuing trial it became evident that he ex-
perienced no sense of wrongdoing for his activities. He maintained, for exam-
ple, that his passionate plea for funds "primed the pump" - that is, induced
people to give to other charities as well as to the one he professed to represent
At the same time, he stated that most donations to charity are made by those
who feel guilty about something and who therefore deserve to be bilked. This
ability to rationalize his behavior and his lack of self-criticism were also evi-
dent in his attempt to solicit aid from the very people he had misled. Perhaps
it is a tribute to his persuasiveness that a number of individuals actually did
come to his support. During his three-year prison term, Donald spent much
time searching for legal loopholes and writing to outside authorities .... [He
requested them to intercede on behalf and in the name of justice they pro-
fessed to represent....
By all accounts Donald was considered a willful and difficult child. When
his desire for candy or toys was frustrated he would begin with a show of
affection and if this failed he would throw a tempter tantrum; the latter was
seldom necessary because his angelic appearance and artful ways usually got
him what he wanted. Similar tactics were used to avoid punishment for his
numerous misdeeds. At first he would attempt to cover up with an elaborate
facade of lies, often shifting the blame to his brothers. If this did not work, he
would give a convincing display of remorse and contrition. When punishment
was unavoidable he would become sullenly defiant, regarding it as an unjusti-
fiable tax on his pleasures.
Although he was obviously very intelligent, his school years were academi-
cally undistinguished. He was restless, easily bored, and frequently truant.
His behavior in the presence of the teacher or some other authority was usu-
ally quite good, but when he was on his own he generally got himself or others
into trouble. Although he was often suspected of being the culprit, he was
adept at talking his way out of difficulty...
His sexual experiences were frequent, casual, and callous. When he was 22
he married a 41-year-old woman whom he had met in a bar. Several other
marriages followed, all bigamous. In each case the pattern was the same: he
would marry someone on impulse, let her support him for several months, and
then leave. One marriage was particularly interesting. After being charged
with fraud Donald was sent to a psychiatric institution for a period of observa-
tion. While there he came to the attention of a female member of the profes-
sional staff. His charm, physical attractiveness, and convincing promises to
reform led her to intervene on his behalf. He was given a suspended sentence
and they were married a week later. At first things went reasonably well, but
when she refused to pay some of his gambling debts he forged her name to a
check and left. He was soon caught and given an 18-month prison term. As
mentioned earlier, he escaped with less than a month left to serve.
It is interesting to note that Donald sees nothing particularly wrong with
his behavior, nor does he express remorse or guilt for using others and causing
them grief. Although his behavior is self-defeating in the long run, he consid-
ers it to be practical and possessed of good sense. Periodic punishments do
nothing to decrease his egotism and confidence in his own abilities, nor do
they offset the often considerable short-term gains of which he is capable.1 81
181. J. CoLEMAN, J. BUTCHER & R. CARSON, ABNORMAL PsYcHOLoGy AND MODERN
LIr. 286 (6th ed. 1980), cited in, R. HARE, PSYCHOPATHY: THEORY AND RESEARCH
1-4 (1970). This is but one clinical case study. Other case studies of individuals
diagnosable as sociopaths may be found in H. CLECKLEY, supra note 39, at 29-187.
See also D. ARAHAMSEN, THE MiND oF THE ACCUSED: A PSYCHIATRIST IN THE
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Donald appears to qualify for a diagnosis of antisocial personality
disorder under the DSM-IIIR.82 He is over 18 and had problems as a
child, including truancy and lying. Furthermore, as an adult he re-
peatedly engaged in antisocial acts, such as fraud, bigamy, and escap-
ing from prison. He has not sustained monogamous relationships, has
repeatedly lied to serve his own purposes, and feels no remorse or
guilt for his actions. Yet, just because he may receive a diagnosis for
purposes of psychiatric treatment does not mean that such behavior
would be viewed as irrational, and thus, seen as a "mental disease or
defect" that should lead to being excused from criminal liability.83
Taking each of Donald's behavioral traits independently, none ap-
pears to be particularly irrational in light of Moore's syllogism for ra-
tional action.1 8 4 For example, his childhood behavior that does not
directly bear on his present sanity can be evaluated as if he were being
charged with "extortion" for candy. When he was a child and wanted
candy, he would begin with a show of affection, and if this failed, he
would throw a temper tantrum. The goal of having a piece of candy is
certainly an understandable goal for a young child. With that motive
in mind, Donald sought to solicit the candy from whoever had the
candy. If that person was his mother or father, it would appear natu-
ral that Donald would be affectionate toward them. Furthermore, be-
ing affectionate is often a way to get a reward, whether it be affection
in return, or in this case, a piece of candy. Where he was unsuccessful
in getting candy, he would become frustrated which would appear to
be a natural reaction to not getting what he wanted. His response
would be anger and would be exhibited by a temper tantrum. Exhibi-
tions of anger are not in and of themselves irrational. The anger was
in response to an anger-provoking situation, and Donald could reason-
ably believe that such a display of emotion would be effective as it
probably had been in the past, i.e., his parents had been conditioned to
give him candy when he got upset.
If Donald were being charged with bigamy, adultery, or some sex-
ual offense, one would be hard pressed to find his behavior irrational
in the sense that it should be excused. Donald's sexual behavior as a
young adult does not seem entirely different from many other people.
One cannot evaluate Donald's behavior in a vacuum. One must look
to the relevant norms and expectations of the society to determine
CouRTRoom 197-213 (1983); THE SOCIOPATH: SELECTIONS IN ANTISOCIAL BEHAV-
IOR (R. Bergman ed. 1968).
182. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
183. Of course, the mental disease or defect would have to lead to the defendant's
inability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions or conform his behavior to
the requirements of law. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)(Proposed Official Draft
1962).
184. Moore, supr note 146, at 58-59, discussed supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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whether any given behavior is irrational.18 5 In today's society, extra-
marital affairs are common place. Furthermore, although the major-
ity of individuals do not engage in bigamy because it is illegal, it was
not always illegal, and the fact that some groups such as the Mormons
endorse bigamy is evidence that the behavior is arguably rational.
In addition, Donald's escape from prison seems quite rational.
Many people would seek to free themselves from incarceration. In
this country, freedom is a fundamental liberty and recognized as a de-
sirable state of being. Because of the strong drive to be free, this goal
of freedom cannot be deemed irrational despite the fact that such ac-
tivity is illegal.
Donald's action of conning people on television for a fake charity is
simply an example of a purely antisocial act resulting from selfish mo-
tives. Donald wanted money, and again evaluating his actions in light
of societal norms, making money is certainly a laudable goal in a capi-
talist society. This society certainly encourages people to use their
abilities to make money. However, Donald chose to make money by
illegal means. Nevertheless, his reasoning was certainly logical. If he
engaged in this conning scheme, he would be able to have enough
money. This act is antisocial but not inherently irrational. Since he
was "wanted" for escaping from prison, the most irrational thing Don-
ald did was appear on television. However, his resulting arrest was
really accidental since he was unaware that the broadcast would be
televised on the national news network and that his captors would see
him.
If a defense attorney were trying to demonstrate that the defend-
ant was insane, the attorney would probably ask a psychiatrist to give
a similar presentation of the above description, including Donald's
past antisocial behavior. Yet, nothing in the above description seems
to particularly reflect on his inability to act rationally, but rather fo-
cuses on very rational acts that were merely antisocial or criminal.
The only fact that might be indicative of irrationality is the fact
that he lacks remorse and feels no guilt for his actions. 8 6 Yet, this is a
fact which is not required for a diagnosis of antisocial personality dis-
order under the DSM-IIIR and may not be present in all defendants
diagnosed with the disorder.
Lack of remorse may be evidence of a rationality impairment.
Normally, when people do something wrong, their conscience "tells"
them that they should feel bad for having done the wrong thing.
185. See Moore, supm 146, at 53; Schopp, supra note 151, at 90.
186. The fact that he feels no remorse does not automatically make his actions irra-
tional. He has been successful in short term gains, whether they be financial or
sexual. He may regard these gains as having been at others' expense, but "what's
done is done," and there may be no need to feel guilt. After all what good does
feeling guilty do anyway?
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From the time that people are old enough to learn, they are taught
that if one wrongs another, one should do penance for the act. Fur-
thermore, what would prompt a person to believe he or she needed to
do penance was to be able to recognize that the act was wrong. If Don-
ald does not recognize that any given act was wrong, and he feels no
remorse for what he did, he may be suffering from some irrationality.
However, using a test of irrationality to find the presence of a "mental
disease or defect" would require a jury determination of whether lack
of remorse is evidence of irrationality.
The ALI would support a jury instruction that would suggest that
evidence regarding the defendant's past antisocial behavior should not
be considered sufficient to excuse him. Yet, the ALI position provides
no guidance to a jury as to what other evidence should be examined to
find the presence of a "mental disease or defect" that would constitute
an excusing condition'8 7 if the remainder of the Model Penal Code
test was satisfied.188 If Moore's conception of mental disease or defect
was embodied in a jury instruction designed for the determination of
whether the defendant has a "mental disease or defect," the jury
would be focusing on the defendant's rationality. Unless the jury
found that the defendant's actions or thoughts were irrational, they
would not consider exonerating him. In the above case of Donald S.,
except for the fact that the defendant feels no guilt or remorse, the
defendant's actions themselves and the basis for his decisions seem
rational.
Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code would not be seen as remov-
ing all evidence of antisocial behavior from the jury. After all, among
the facts presented may be some evidence of irrationality that might
constitute an excusing "mental disease or defect." However, what the
ALI wanted to convey to the jury was that the mere fact of repeated
criminal behavior was insufficient to exonerate a defendant.
The current DSM-IIIR diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
is primarily one of past antisocial behavior. The diagnosis does not
explicitly call for rationality deficits and a jury would have to infer
from the behavior itself that some irrationality existed. As in the case
of Donald S., evidence of irrationality may not exist.
The ALI would require the jury to determine what the definition
of mental disease or defect is, rather than leaving that determination
to an expert witness. A jury could certainly get the impression after
the long diagnostic description that a defendant possessed a "mental
disease or defect." The defendant may very well have a mental dis-
ease for purposes of treatment, but the jury must make a legal deter-
mination of what that mental disease or defect is. If Moore's paradigm
187. See supm note 157 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
1990]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that rationality constitutes the defining characteristic for the finding
of a mental impairment was accepted, the jury would essentially de-
cide whether the defendant was an irrational actor who should be ex-
cused from criminal responsibility.18 9 With psychopaths, it is unlikely
that the antisocial actions themselves would be evidence of irrational-
ity.190 As the Model Penal Code caveat paragraph suggested, such evi-
dence should not be relied on as the sole evidence of mental
impairment. Rather, there must be some other evidence for finding
that the defendant possesses a mental disease or defect.
VI. CONCLUSION
For many years, the legal system had divested itself of the power to
define the exculpating conditions for insanity and had given that
power to science. 19 1 Psychiatrists and psychologists became the au-
thority on who was legally insane.192
Recognizing that a diagnosis for therapeutic reasons could not be
equated with a definition of legal insanity, the ALI specifically at-
tempted to exclude certain individuals who could possibility be given
diagnoses by the medical community, but for legal and moral reasons
should not be exonerated. The Model Penal Code's definition of
mental disease or defect was not designed to be a psychological con-
cept of mental illness, but rather a legal one. Not every medically rec-
ognized mental disease was intended to be included in the definition of
"mental disease or defect," in particular, that of the psychopath.193
The DSM-IIIR diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is based
upon a life history of violations of social norms and rules, e.g., truancy,
frequent casual sexual relations, impulsivity, and behavior that vio-
lates the rights of others. 9 4 Unlike other diagnostic categories, the
antisocial personality disorder does not include having delusions or
hallucinations. Psychopaths are not psychotic and do not fail to make
interpersonal contacts.195 Their actions do not seem inherently irra-
189. However, if another conception of responsibility is used, a different result may
follow. See Fairall & Johnston, supra note 2, at 94 ("On legal and conceptual
grounds, the strongest case for allowing [antisocial personality disorder] as a basis
for pleading insanity, occurs when the test of responsibility is couched in terms of
volitional and emotional incapacities").
190. See M. SMrrH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRMINAL 146-47 (1983)(stating that psy-
chopaths "are not 'insane' "). Cf R. LASKY, EVALUATION OF CRIMINAL RESPONSI-
BILITY IN MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE RELATED DISSOCIATIVE DISORDERS: A
PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSIDERATION 40-63 (1982)(arguing that although a psycho-
logical disorder may be present, observers may be unable to see the "disorder,"
and thus, be unable to correctly evaluate the defendant's criminal responsibility).
191. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 7-29 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
195. S. SMITH & R. MEYER, supra note 1, at 519.
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tional or based on faulty assumptions. Unlike the schizophrenic who
believes that God is commanding him to act,1 96 the psychopath may be
motivated by selfish aims. These goals may not be inherently
irrational.
Legal responsibility should be determined based on legal concep-
tions rather than medical conceptions of excuse. The ALI attempted
to exclude from eligibility for the insanity defense those individuals
who are simply habitually engaging in antisocial behavior but may re-
ceive a diagnosis for this behavior. The ALI's attempt was laudable,
and more courts should recognize the distinction between medical and
legal conceptions of a "mental disease or defect" and instruct the jury
accordingly.
The jury should excuse a defendant based on legal notions of an
excusing condition. The jury should not be allowed to be misled by
experts trying to show that the defendant has a clinically recognized
illness and make the improper leap from clinical to legal definitions of
the terms "mental disease or defect." The ALI wanted to preclude
such a result. That result can be prevented by instructing the jury
properly and not allowing them to give deference to clinicians, who
could theoretically find a mental disease or defect existing for treat-
ment purposes where there is none for legal purposes.
Emily Campbell '91*
196. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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